Recently, a colour image encryption algorithm based on chaos was proposed by cascading two position permutation operations and one substitution operation, which are all determined by some pseudo-random number sequences generated by iterating the Logistic map. This paper evaluates the security level of the encryption algorithm and finds that the position permutation-only part and the substitution part can be separately broken with only ⌈(log 2 (3MN))/8⌉ and 2 chosen plainimages, respectively, where MN is the size of the plain-image. Concise theoretical analyses are provided to support the chosen-plaintext attack, which are verified by experimental results also.
Introduction
Security of multimedia data (image, video, audio/speech) become more and more important as it is transmitted over all kinds of wired/wireless networks more and more frequently. Both design and security analysis of multimedia encryption algorithms have been received keen attention of the related researchers in the past decade [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] . Due to the subtle similarity between some dynamical properties of chaos, like sensitivity to changes of initial condition and control parameter of chaotic systems, and the basic properties of cryptography, diffusion and confusion, chaos was considered as a special way to design secure and efficient encryption algorithm [6, 7, 8] . As image data is a representative form of multimedia data, and it helps to show the claimed good performances of the proposed encryption algorithms, most chaos-based encryption algorithms adopt image data as encryption object.
According to the record of Web of Science, more than four hundred papers on designing chaos-based image encryption schemes were published between 1997 and 2011 (inclusive). Meanwhile, no more than one hundred and half papers on security analysis of chaos-based image encryption schemes were published. Short of scrutiny on the security makes many chaos-based image encryption schemes are insecure against some conventional attacks, such as known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack [9, 10, 11, 12] . Some representative chaos-based encryption algorithms and a general framework evaluating security of this class of encryption algorithms were concluded in [13] . In many chaos-based image encryption algorithms, a chaos system, composed of one or more chaotic maps, is used to generate pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS), which is then adopted to determine and control combination of some basic encryption functions [14, 15] . In digital domain, finite precision computation and quantization process make some dynamical properties of chaos system be degenerated in some form, which may cause potential threat to security of the chaos-based encryption algorithms [16] .
The present paper analyzes the security of the image encryption algorithms proposed in [17] and finds that the three basic encryption operations of the algorithm are all key-invertible, i.e. the unknown information controlling an encryption operation can be derived directly from the input and its output result. Furthermore, the three encryption functions are run independently. So, the position permutation part and the substitution part of the image encryption algorithm under study can be broken separately with a few chosen plain-images. Both detailed theoretical analyses and experimental results are presented to support the chosen-plaintext attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the image encryption algorithm un-der study briefly. Section 3 presents an efficient chosenplaintext attack on the encryption algorithm with some experimental results. The last section concludes the paper.
The colour image encryption algorithm under study
The plaintext of the encryption algorithm under study is a RGB colour image of size M × N (height×width), which can be represented as a M × N ×3 matrix of pixel values
. Then, the colour image encryption algorithm under study can be described as follows 1 .
• The secret key is composed of two positive integers m 1 , m 2 , and two sets of initial condition and control parameter of the logistic map
, where x 0 , x * 0 ∈ (0, 1), and µ 0 , µ * 0 ∈ (3.5699456, 4).
• The initialization procedure: are all equal to MN, update the last 1 To make the presentation more concise and complete, some notations in the original paper [17] are modified under the condition that essential form of the encryption algorithm is kept unchanged.
3MN − 1 elements as follows: for
where n 0 , n 1 , n 2 represent the number of 0, 1, 2 in
14 ⌋ mod 256.
• The encryption procedure is a simple concatenation of the following three encryption operations.
(1) Row permutation:
where
(2) Column permutation:
Then, one pixel is selected iteratively from the other un-encrypted pixels of the intermediate image
, determining which channel's pixel is chosen. The selected pixels are encrypted by the previous selected pixel, the corresponding cipher-pixel and a pseudorandom number as follows: calculate
n k and n k ′ represent the number of k and k
and {Y t } l−1 t=0 , respectively. 2
• The decryption procedure is similar to the encryption one except the following points: (1) the above encryption operations are run in a reverse order; (2) the permutation sequences are replaced by their invertible versions; (3) equation (2) and Eq. (3) are replaced by
respectively.
Chosen-plaintext attack
In [17, Sec. 3.2.6], it is claimed that the image encryption algorithm under study is robust against chosen-plaintext attack based on the following two points: (a) the used PRNSs are all sensitive to changes of secret key; (b) the substitution function (3) owns a feed-back mechanism. However, we will show that the claim is not right in this section. As the image encryption algorithm under study is composed of three independent encryption operations, the position permutation part and the substitution part can be broken separately with a strategy of Divide and Conquer.
As for plain-images of fixed value, both the Row permutation and the Column permutation are canceled and only the Substitution is left. Assume two chosen plain-images of fixed value 
Referring to Eq. (3), one has (9) where (I
Then, a property of (I 
where l * < 3MN − 1. Then, let us study the case for l = (l * + 1). From Eq. (9), one has
This completes the mathematical induction, hence finishes the proof of the property.
Utilizing Property 1, one can get the estimated version of Y 0 ,
where #(·) denotes the cardinality of a set. Once the value of Y 0 is determined, the estimated values of
, can be obtained in order with the similar method, namely set 
holds if and only if
where 
From Property 1 and the hypothesis, one has Assume that Y l uniformly distributes over {0, 1, 2} for l = 0 ∼ 3MN − 1, one can calculate the probability that condition (13) in Property 2 hold for a given l * and T ,
where k ∈ {1, · · · , ⌊2MN/T ⌋}. Then, an upper bound of the probability that condition (13) hold can be got as
When T = 128, one can calculate Prob(2272 · 1704) ≈ 1.1173·10 −16 for a relatively big plain-image of size 2272× 1704. As for plain-images of smaller size, one can assure that the success probability of this attack is much bigger than (1 − 1.12 · 10 −16 ) due to that the following points hold at the same time.
• The upper bound probability Prob(MN) is a strictly increasing function with respect to MN;
• Even Eq. (13) • The value of Prob(MN) is calculated by summarizing the probability of some cases that may happen simultaneously.
Based on the above analysis, one can conclude that breaking of the Substitution part can be implemented successfully with an extremely high probability.
Once the equivalent secret key determining Substitution is recovered, the image encryption algorithm under study becomes a position permutation-only gray-scale image encryption algorithm composing of the Row permutation and the Column permutation. Considering the number of possible positions of every plain-pixel is 3MN, the bit length of each element of chosen plaintext should be ⌈log 2 (3MN)⌉ to assure that every permuted elements are different from each other. As bit size of every channel of plain-image is fixed to 8, only ⌈(log 2 (3MN))/8⌉ pairs of chosen plain-images are required to recover the equivalent version of {T l }
3M−1 l=0
and
. Referring to quantitative cryptanalysis of permutation-only encryption algorithms in [19, 20] , the complexity of breaking the position permutation part is only O (3MN) .
To validate the performance of the proposed attack, a great number of experiments on some plain-images of size 512 × 512 were made with some randomly selected secret keys. When . Then, ⌈(log 2 (3 × 2 9 · 2 9 ))/8⌉ = 3 pairs of chosen plain-image are constructed to recover the equivalent secret of the position permutation-only part. Finally, the equivalent versions of the sub-keys controlling two main encryption parts are used together to break a cipher-image encrypted with the same secret key, which is shown in Fig. 1c ). The decryption result is shown in Fig. 1d ) and it is identical with the original plain-image, which verifies the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
Conclusion
This paper studied the security of a novel colour image encryption algorithm based on chaos proposed in [17] . It is found that the encryption algorithm can be broken with chosen-plaintext attack efficiently. The number of required chosen plain-images and complexity of the attacking are proportional to a logarithm of size of plain-images and the size, respectively. As a conclusion, the image encryption algorithm under study is not suggested in serious applications requiring a high level of security.
